The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Transparency of Executive Remuneration Policy in Public Banks in Poland
 
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Publish date: 2015-08-31
 
Gospodarka Narodowa 2015;278(4):137–157
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ABSTRACT
The article seeks to assess the transparency of remuneration policy vis-à-vis senior executives in Polish banks from 2005 to 2013 based on a sample of 16 banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The study attempts to identify factors that determine the transparency of executive remuneration policy. This is measured by an index based on the level and structure of remuneration, along with the policy on variable components of executive pay, the functioning of board compensation committees, and long-term incentive programs based on shareholding. The authors find that WSE-listed banks are steadily increasing the disclosure of their remuneration policies. The biggest changes in this area occurred in 2012 as a result of new regulations, the authors note. The study shows that there is a positive relationship between the disclosure of executive remuneration policies and corporate governance mechanisms such as compensation committees as well as the role of pension funds in the banks’ ownership structures. The degree of ownership concentration may indirectly affect the transparency of executive remuneration policy through corporate governance processes and mechanisms that banks operating in Poland borrow from markets where their parent companies are listed, the authors say. They add that the most transparent executive remuneration policies exist in banks controlled by investors from English-speaking countries. An above-average level of remuneration policy disclosure has been observed in large banks and those whose CEOs receive higher pay than their counterparts in other banks.
eISSN:2300-5238
ISSN:0867-0005